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Abstract: What follows will support the centrality of appeals to the integrity of places as a plausible
way of extending the concept of integrity in the light of our actual practices of valuing. The emphasis
will, however, be upon practices of valuing rather than upon metaphysical claims about “inherent
value”. The latter are not dismissed, they are merely set aside. The guiding thought is that our ethical
theory should not depart too greatly from our understanding of how and what humans actually
do hold to be of value in any particular culturally-shaped context. Following an introduction to
the concept of integrity (Section 1), the discussion will open with an attempt to show that we do
sometimes value places non-instrumentally (Section 2), even though we tend to look elsewhere to
justify our respect for, and valuing of, places (Section 3). It will then proceed through a defence of
appeals to such valuing as ethically significant (Section 4), before moving on to a provisional account
of integrity as an effective way of making sense of what it is that we value when we value places in
their own right (Section 5). Unlike Rolston, who is strongly associated with the concept of integrity,
the intention is not to go metaphysically deep and identify something akin to the moral properties of
things. Rather, the concern will be with the kinds of considerations that agents would typically point
to as a reason for valuing places without any deeper set of claims about inherent value. This provides
a less troubling, more metaphysically “neutral”, way of addressing matters. The paper is intended
for an audience working on Geoethics; however, the norms of argument will be those associated
more narrowly with philosophical ethics.
Keywords: integrity; valuing; duty; respect; rights
1. The Concept of Integrity
The concept of “integrity” features regularly in discussions about Geoethics. It is, for example,
mentioned in the list of fundamental values set out in the Cape Town Statement on Geoethics
(2016), which require: “Honesty, integrity, transparency and reliability of the geoscientist, including
strict adherence to scientific methods” [1]. Appeals to “research integrity” figure repeatedly in the
collection Geoethics: Ethical Challenges and Case Studies in Earth Sciences (2015) edited by Wyss and
Peppoloni [2]. It is, again, mentioned as an important trait of the researcher in Nataliya Nikitina’s
Geoethics: Theory, Principles, Problems (2016), where the concept of integrity is also, occasionally, used in
broader ways [3]; and it figures prominently in a recent overview of Geoethics as an emerging field,
by Bobrowski et al. (2017) in a larger American Geophysical Union volume on Scientific Integrity and
Ethics with Applications to the Geosciences [4].
Perhaps surprisingly, the concept occurs less regularly in discussions about philosophical ethics.
This poses some difficulties given that what follows will not seek to provide an overview of the various
geoethical approaches towards integrity, but will be a more limited exercise in philosophical ethics,
i.e., ethics within the academic traditions associated with Kant, Mill, and Aristotle, and influenced
by the techniques of modern “analytic philosophy”. Yet, even within ethics of this sort there has
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generally been at least some ongoing background discussion of the concept [5,6]. Now there is growing
interest, an emerging and more cohesive discourse [7,8]. However, the dominant sense of the concept
within such philosophical discussions is that of the integrity of persons rather than the integrity of
places. The latter is called upon only more occasionally, and is perhaps most closely associated with
unsystematic appeals to integrity by Aldo Leopold in A Sand County Almanac (1949), and with a classic
(and more systematic) paper on the environmental ethics of outer space by Holmes Rolston (1986),
where it is embedded within a broader set of controversial assumptions about “inherent value” [9].
Given the unsystematic nature of Leopold’s work (which says more about love for the natural than
about its integrity) I will take it that the most important treatment of the concept is Rolston’s. There is,
as we might expect, a broader literature drawing from and related to both, such as Chris Preston’s
Saving Creation: Nature and Faith in the Life of Holmes Rolston III (2009), and the Leopold-influenced work
of Laura Westra of the Global Ecological Integrity Group, who has focused more persistently upon
the question of ecological integrity since the publication of The Principle of Integrity: An Environmental
Proposal for Ethics (1994). However, the present paper is not an attempt to adjudicate between rival
conceptions and ways of taking up the legacy of Rolston. It is written from a broadly liberal standpoint
which allows that while integrity is a key concept for geoethics, it may be articulated in significantly
different ways, and in line with different, culturally-inflected conceptions of what is good. What is
held in common is attention to structrures as wholes rather than merely aggregates. With regard to
this at least, Leopold, Rolston, and others are in agreement.
What follows will support the centrality of appeals to the integrity of places as a plausible way of
extending our understanding of ethics in the light of our actual practices of valuing. As a clarification,
integrity is not the only ethical concept that is needed for Geoethics or the main concept that is needed.
But integrity is an important part of the larger Geoethical toolkit, particularly when issues of our
duties in relation to outer space are under consideration. (On this much, Rolston was correct). As a
further reclarification, the emphasis will be upon practices of valuing rather than (as in Rolston) upon
metaphysical claims about inherent value. The latter are not dismissed, they are merely set aside.
The guiding thought is that our ethical theory should not be too dependent upon them and should not
depart too greatly from our understanding of how and what humans actually do hold to be of value.
The discussion will open with an attempt to show that we do sometimes value places
non-instrumentally (Section 2), even though we tend to look elsewhere in order to justify such valuing
(Section 3). This relies upon standard moves from environmental ethics. It will then proceed through a
defence of appeals to such valuing as ethically significant (Section 4), before moving on to a provisional
account of an appeal to integrity as an effective way of making sense of what it is that we value
when we value places in their own right (Section 5). However, talk about what it is that we value
when we value places in their own right will be more concerned with the kinds of considerations that
agents would typically point to as a reason for valuing rather than any deeper set of metaphysical
assumptions. As far as possible, metaphysical commitments will be kept to a minimum. Precedents
for such an approach of keeping metaphysical assumptions in check when discussing philosophical
ethics can be found in Hilary Putnam’s Spinoza lectures, published as Ethics without Ontology (2005),
and Raimond Gaita’s Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception (2004).
2. Valuing Places
A familiar line of environmental thought, known as the “Last Man Argument”, suggests that we
value places in ways that go beyond their usefulness to us [10]. The classic version of the argument
has been subject to so many qualifications that, for the sake of simplicity, a modified version will be
used here:
Imagine the last human alive. He lays waste to forests, levels mountains, and destroys unique
geological features. The Old Man of Hoy is toppled. The Blue Canyon in Arizona, with its majestic
minaret-like structures, is blown up. The Giant’s Causeway is pounded to dust and the Zhangye
Danxia Geopark is utterly flattened. Surely, our strong intuition here is that this destroyer of things
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and places does something wrong, even if no one else is around to be harmed? If this is so then, in spite
of the high standing of various ethical theories (rights theories and consequentialisms) that draw upon
Kant and Mill in order to insist that only humans or sentient beings are of value, what we actually
value non-instrumentally or in its own right includes at least some non-sentient places and things.
This is not, of course, to suggest that we all value the same place and things. Valuing exhibits all
sorts of cultural variation. However, as a cross-cultural point, valuing is not restricted to beings like
ourselves or even to sentient creatures.
This is not, of course, a compelling argument. It may not even be an argument in the strictest
sense. It could be regarded as a thought experiment (it certainly includes one). The suggestion here
is not that we can rely upon it uncritically. Rather, the suggestion is that an appeal to the Last Man
draws our attention to something important about our ethical theories: they do not obviously match
up with all of our practices of valuing. We can, of course, acknowledge this as a strictly psychological
point and claim that we value beyond the bounds of what can reasonably be justified. Valuing that can
reasonably be justified on such an approach will still be exclusively a matter of valuing living things
(individually, or in groups, or through the valuing of larger wholes that include them).
This would still offer a range of options. We might, for example, be drawn towards what is
known as “sentientism” [11], i.e., the view that only beings capable of feeling have moral standing.
Or we may be drawn towards what is known as “biocentrism” [12], i.e., a view which extends moral
standing to all living things irrespective of their levels of sentience [13]. Or we may be drawn towards a
more Leopoldian “Land Ethic”, in which biotic or ecological communities are given moral precedence
over their individual constituents [12,14]. Valuing places in their own right, without any concern for
human or biotic advantages, with or without any consideration of actual biota/living things, stretches
beyond all of these bounds and may seem to involve sentimentality, or a concealed anthropomorphism,
or something similarly undesirable.
Alternatively, we may accept the intuition associated with appeal to the Last Man and say
that a liveable ethic ought to be able to accommodate the reasonableness of valuing the things that
well-placed and well-informed agents ordinarily do value. This kind of approach flows out of a
particular conception of what ethics is ultimately for. As a useful simplification, we may say that it
treats ethics as the discussion of reasons for action and responding, within the constraints of what is
psychologically and practically available and normal for beings such as ourselves. These are usually
referred to, by philosophical ethicists, as the constraints of “moral psychology” [15]. An appreciation
of cultural diversity may expand our understanding of the constraints of moral psychology, but it will
not remove the conviction that there are such constraints or collapse cultural diversity into the view
that just anything could count as a livable ethic.
It is not, then, the business of ethics to become too far removed from known and available ways
of acting and responding, but to explore the boundaries of the latter. As a point of fact about our
practices of valuing, we do seem to value places and in some cases we value them in ways that go
beyond any belief that we or others can gain something useful from them. We may recognize their
beauty, be enchanted by their strangeness, and be intrigued by their complexity. Whatever the reason,
part of what it is to value places in the relevant sense is to be prepared to forego various practical
advantages in order to protect them from certain kinds of alteration and damage, even if we ourselves
have no prospect of ever directly experiencing the places in question. As an example, we may think
of an ageing ecologist who is no longer in a position to go into a wilderness but who nonetheless
still defends it, without the prospect that he may enjoy a future beneficial wilderness experience [16].
In a familiar philosophical terminology: we value such places non-instrumentally. For convenience,
“valuing” below will mean “non-instrumental valuing”, unless otherwise stated.
In this respect, our actual attitudes towards one another and towards places overlap. We value
both humans and places in ways which are, at least sometimes, non-instrumental. Additionally, here,
by places, what is meant is objects from entire mountain ranges, canyons, and uninhabited forests
through to progressively more modest local structures such as Uluru/Ayer’s Rock, Stonehenge, and the
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site of the first lunar landing, down to the scale of anything that might be identified as a location
where we might, at least in theory, go. This will involve various exclusions: sub-atomic particles
have locations but they are not places in the relevant sense. We could not go where they are, even in
principle. However, in some sense the Sun is a place. In principle we could go there, in practice we
could not. As a clarification, we do not require that such places constitute ecosystems or value them
in ways which are necessarily linked to their life-carrying capacity. We do not always value them in
anything akin to a Leopoldian way.
However, our practices of valuing humans and valuing places are not identical. We do not,
for example, value them equally. It takes the addition of a special theory of value, e.g., the idea that all
value bearers have value equally [17,18], before the latter idea seems at all plausible. Value equality
is not a position that is endorsed here. We can still understand why someone might sacrifice their
life to save a place because it is “just as important” or “more important”. Many people have done so,
and they have not all seemed like fanatics. However, there is no calculus of value that would allow us
to establish a proper exchange rate between humans and places and thereby allow us to determine
whether or not such individuals have done the right thing. We would be even less understanding
about someone who sacrificed the lives of others in order to save a place from destruction, on the basis
of a theory about its value and the value of those unfortunately sacrificed. In part, this is because
talk about the value of humans does not ordinarily mean “quantifiable value”, even though we may
sometimes be called upon to make difficult judgments about saving one human or group of humans at
the expense of others. In short, a practice of valuing places, in the sense described, need not entail any
particular attitude towards comparisons between people, other sentient beings, other life forms and
places (when thought of in a sentience-independent way). On its own, such a practice need not be
seen as a threat to our sense of the special importance of humans or our special obligations towards
them. It does, however, involve regarding places as important in their own right, independently of
any prospect of human advantage. Here, it may also be best to avoid saying that the places in question
are valued “for their own sake”, because that genuinely would presuppose something like agency and
sentience, and would raise concerns about anthropomorphism. The relevant thought may be better
captured by saying that they are valued “in their own right”.
3. Arguments for Indirect Valuing
Valuing places, in the sense described, need not covertly be an attitude towards something else.
However, justifications for valuing or, more simply, caring about places tend to direct our attention
elsewhere, away from any idea that they should be valued in their own right. In some, perhaps
all, cases, we can tell a more indirect story about why we might take measures to protect places
from damage. Such an approach draws from Immanuel Kant and his attitude towards animals [19].
On Kant’s view, we are justified in caring for animals because we have respect for persons. If we
are cruel to the former, we will damage our character and will then be more likely to harm the latter.
Similarly, we may care about and protect places, but only because we have respect for persons. On more
extended approaches, the care might be justified by appeal to the value of sentient beings, or of living
beings or of life. However, in each case the principle is the same: it is not the places themselves that
matter. If we are truly rational, on such an approach, then we may still value places, but in a more
instrumental manner, as an indirect way of valuing and respecting one another (or fellow creatures,
or life). A good deal of cultural heritage argumentation works in precisely this way: places and things
are to be protected because they are, or are akin to, artifacts valued by some or other human culture.
To damage the objects and places, or to represent them in unfavourable ways, is to disrespect the
cultures in question. We should not do it without some compelling reason, just as we should not
desecrate burial grounds without a compelling reason, even if we have no belief in the spirits of
the dead.
Such an approach works better with some places than with others. It fails to justify a good many
of our inclinations to protect important sites. It works well in the case of Stonehenge because it is an
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artefact, constructed by humans, rather than a more strictly natural feature of the landscape. It also
makes sense of the intuition that if Stonehenge was a comparably natural feature, then our attitude
towards it might, reasonably, be different. Accordingly, when it is proposed that a tunnel should be
constructed under Stonehenge in order to help ease local traffic, we can understand why this might
involve a failure of respect for past or present humans who have important relations to the site: causal
relations, relations of attachment, and relations bound up with identity and with ways of valuing
of the past. This is, however, less obvious with forests where humans do not dwell, or with other
non-artifacts. Similarly, we can make the connection to the importance of humans quite easily when
we consider an Apollo landing site. Protection of the latter is all about our attitude towards humans,
but it is harder to make a similar connection when we think about the Lunar South Pole, a place which
humans have yet to visit.
Yet, in the case of non-artefacts too (forests, islands, mountains, and geophysical structures in
general), if we are sufficiently determined to reject the idea of valuing places in their own right,
we may still build plausible narratives about their human significance. Indeed, geoheritage discussions
(by contrast with cultural heritage discussions more generally) have typically focused upon natural
features with a heritage significance, rather than anything more akin to artefacts, although there are
exceptions [20]. The standing of “heritage” does not imply the standing of “artefact”. Mars and the
Moon are obvious cases in point. They are not artefacts, but they are still culturally significant. They are,
in an elusive term with special legal significance, part of the “common heritage of mankind” [21,22].
Mars without the Valles Marineris, a canyon 4000 km and up to 7 km deep, or without Olympus Mons,
a shield volcano almost 22 km tall, would be missing something important, although it may be harder
to say exactly what they would be missing other than the objects themselves. Additionally, the issue is
not aesthetic, or at least not directly so. It does not concern what seen by humans, but what is known
to be there. Similarly, we would not allow someone to hollow-out the interior of the Sphinx for tourist
souvenirs, even if the surface appearance of the Sphinx remained unaltered. We would not allow the
Valles to be used as a conveniently large dump for waste. We would not allow Olympus Mons to be
quarried for driveway chips or bathroom tiles, or for any other trivial reason.
However, appeals to cultural heritage still do not extend far enough to apply to all of the places,
structures and things that many of us may be inclined to protect. It is unlikely, for example, that a
cultural heritage argument of the above sort, one that applies to Mars and the Moon, could be applied
in quite the same way in relation to the big four bodies in the asteroid belt: Ceres, Vesta, Pallas,
and Hygiea. Olympus Mons would be protected, but Rheasilvia (on Vesta) might not, even though it
is slightly taller. These objects (which are also places) simply do not figure in the same way in human
literature, art, and cultural imagery. Dante did not write about them, as he did about Mars and the
Moon [23].
Even so, some argumentative moves remain possible. Hypothetical extensions of Kantian
arguments have been developed in relation to sites of significance to other, intelligent, beings from
elsewhere [24]. We would (arguably) have reasons to respect at least some of the objects that such
beings value or have valued in the past, and they would have comparably good reasons to value what
has mattered to us. This would apply even if one civilisation discovered only historic traces of the
other. This is partly because rational beings matter, irrespective of where they come from, and partly
because our attitude towards the past is not strictly instrumental, we do not regard it only as a guide
to future actions. Civilisations are generally accorded respect even when they are no longer around,
just as individuals are regarded as worthy of respect even when they are dead. A civilisation which
simply threw its dead away, or recycled them for chemical components, in the manner of Huxley’s
Brave New World (1931), would be significantly outside of our regular experience of what civilisations
are like and outside of our understanding of normal human moral psychology. For various reasons,
people continue to be important to others even when they have ceased to exist.
By adding some forward-looking considerations about time we can also add a further series of
pathways which can justify care for places indirectly, by appeal to respect for humans or for humanity
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as a whole. Pathways of this sort will allow us to appreciate that (arguably) we ought sometimes to
protect places that no one has ever considered to be important in their own right. There are, no doubt,
many objects and places which have not, in the past, been culturally significant to humans or to anyone
else, but which might well take on this significance in the future. On this line of thought, one of
the reasons why we should not permit damage to Olympus Mons is the iconic, identity-building
status that the great volcano would assume for any future humans who come to live and work there.
(A prospect that seems to be within the reach of the second half of the present century, so we should not
be complacent and say “This is so distant a possibility that it does not matter”). Similar considerations
might apply to places where there are no other human-focused reasons for protection. They will apply
to Rheasilvia, application to which may even been taken as an adequacy test for a theory of protection:
does it apply to Rheasilvia as well as Olympus Mons?
Given the small number of large-scale bodies in the asteroid belt, and the strategic significance of
the latter as a source of metals for any ambitious, space-faring human civilisation, there may be grounds
for some manner of protection from trivial use because of what Rheasilvia could and probably would
come to mean to humans in the future. It is tempting to say that human psychology abhors too much
uniformity in a landscape. Sites that would make a place more liveable, and less like a magnificent but
desolate quarry, may be good candidates for protection, independently of any consideration of their
past cultural significance. Mars is one such place, ideally suited as a base for mining the asteroids,
because it would take far less energy to reach the asteroid belt from Mars than it would do from the
Earth. It might also avoid some of the anomie associated with soulless mining stations. However, it is
such a place partly because of its distinctive, unique landscape.
We can, in short, build overlapping narratives about why our concern for places and for
non-sentient things can be justified as indirect ways of showing concern for one another, or for
humanity as a whole (past, present, and future). Perhaps, for any object or place, at least some
such story will always be available. For a large class of cases, these are also, perhaps, the kind of
stories that we ought to tell, especially if our concern is with social ethics and policy formation rather
than with individual ethics and with what any given individual agent ought to be committed to.
Considerations of a similarly human-focused sort have a proven track record. They have been an
important driving force behind all of the existing legislation on planetary protection. In line with
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the main international agreement dealing with such
protection, back contamination (accidental microbial transfer from elsewhere to the Earth) is to be
avoided in order to protect us; and forward contamination (from Earth to elsewhere) is to be avoided
because it will compromise science, which is of value to humans. While it may be argued that back
contamination is covertly driven by broader considerations, the stated rationale behind internationally
agreed planetary protection has always been concern for humans and for humanity as a whole [25].
This kind of appeal to the importance of humans as the real, justifiable underpinning of our
valuing of places may often be the most pragmatic way to go. It has a ready hold upon us. Planetary
protection, in the existing strict legal sense initially established by the OSA, followed by NASA’s
planetary protection office and used by COSPAR (the main body tasked with devising the relevant
classifications of place and protocols for action), is based around such considerations and not
around notions about valuing places in their own right. Nevertheless, there has, in recent years,
been a broadening of the discussion involving both bodies [26] and the discussion of such matters
within newer bodies, such as The International Association for Geoethics (IAGETH), evidences an
openness towards broader, and less-anthropocentric, justifications for valuing, sometimes in the light
of sympathies for the classification of our current geological era as the Anthropocene. If our human
influence has now reached this far, this realization may underline the importance of allowing room for
the non-human.
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4. Keeping Motivations and Justifications Aligned
There do seem to be good, instrumental (or pragmatic, or prudential) reasons for us to support
the protection of places by appeal to our duties towards one another, our respect for one another,
and for humans past and generations yet to come. However, should we always justify the protection of
places only in such a way? One reason why we might not do so concerns what ethicists have, in recent
decades, refered to as “moral schizophrenia”, i.e., a predicament in which the justifications that we are
able to offer for action, response, and valuing become separated from our actual motivations for acting,
responding, and valuing [27]. The classic examples of this are known as “hospital cases”. Ethical
theories often tell us that we should care for others as a matter of duty, or because it will promote the
greatest good, or because it is a virtuous thing to do. But imagine visiting a dear and close friend who
is in hospital and explaining this to them: “I have come to see you out of a sense of duty” seems rather
cold; “I have come here to maximise the greatest good”, would perhaps be counter-productive; “I am
here because it is the virtuous thing to do” sounds quite self-centred. We can, of course, remain silent
about our reasons for visiting, or simply lie in a socially licensed manner. However, that seems to be
out of keeping with the openness that we may expect between friends. What is odd here is that the
motivation behind the visit, i.e., the care we have for the friend, cannot itself be offered as the reason
(the justification) for the visit without departing from the available theories. The real motive for the
visit and the justification that the latter will allow us to offer have become separated.
Sticking with a merely indirect (human, sentient or life-focused) story about why places are
worthy of our attention and care introduces the risk of a similar separation between our justifications
for valuing places and our motivations for doing so. Of course, these two are never completely aligned.
We are psychologically complex beings with many different things going on, and we are the products
of cultural environments that vary considerably. The moral schizophrenia charge is not about these
matters, or about the regular forms of cognitive dissonance that humans display. Rather, it is concerned
with a more radical misalignment of motivations and justifications. A misalignment so radical that
it might also be called artificial. This is particularly awkward in our personal relations with others
we care for in deep ways, where love is a motivating factor that ethical theories often find difficult
to accommodate.
However, the problem is not restricted to such cases. In order to see this, a comparison with
animal ethics may be instructive. Until recently, work in animal ethics has been strongly focused upon
animal rights and, more especially, upon a version of the latter that takes such rights to be based upon
sentience alone, i.e., upon the sheer capacity for thought and feeling, or upon a special kind of sentience,
rather than upon actual interests [17,28]. The result is that matters such as cruelty, which seem to be
far more concerned with interests than with mere sentience, have tended to fall out of the picture.
Appeals to cruelty have, as a result, been deliberately downplayed as a form of sentimentality [29,30].
The problem here is that people continue to become interested in animal rights largely because of
issues of cruelty, and they remain motivated to defend animal rights out of a concern for such cruelty,
i.e., a concern that they no longer feel able to use in justifications. Motivations and justifications then
diverge although, in practice, we may suspect that the real motivations continue to exercise a covert
influence, a predicament which makes dialogue between supporters and critics of animal rights much
harder because the discussions skim across the surface of much deeper commitments.
As a point of clarification, the suggestion is not that the very idea of animal rights is flawed
but that the theory often used to support such rights introduces a problem of moral schizophrenia
by failing to connect them more strongly and directly with animal interests, i.e., with the primary
motivation for supporting such rights. One familiar way to solve the problem is to say that animals
have rights whenever they have an interest that is strong enough to ground a duty on the part of
others [31,32]. With such an approach, motivation and justification will tend to converge. What is at
stake in such convergence is both an issue of personal integrity (as agents, it is better if our motivations
and the justifications that we offer are not too far apart from one another) and a matter of impact and
the connection between ethical theory and actual policy. The consideration that is banished is precisely
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the kind of consideration that might allow the theory to address the broader public in more effective
ways. Geoethics, which is in an earlier stage of development than either animal ethics, might do well
to avoid a similar, and politically marginalizing, predicament. If the motivation behind concern for
places sometimes (perhaps often) goes beyond our concern for one another, then this is something
that should be openly recognized rather than concealed behind a quite different narrative about our
reasons for valuing.
5. The Integrity of Places
If the above is broadly correct then at least sometimes we care about places because they are the
places that they are, because they are unique and enhance the diversity of the world, because of their
special history, and for similarly non-instrumental reasons. Moreover, if we are to avoid the above
problem of moral schizophrenia, these are the kinds of reasons that we should offer to someone who
asks “Why protect this place? Who are you to say what can and cannot be done?” Yet, this leaves
us with a problem of how to make sense of what it is overall that we are responding to when we
respond to such places by valuing them. Understood in terms of proposals for policy formation, this is
not primarily a problem of the deep metaphysics of value. Rather, it is a problem of settling upon
a suitable vocabulary for Geoethics. Moreover, for breadth of appeal, we do not need a vocabulary
which presupposes that places ought to be valued in their own right and dismisses rival standpoints.
Rather, and more minimally, what is needed is a vocabulary that is capable of, at least sometimes,
directing our attention more to the places themselves than to our concern for one another.
Although it concerns moral vocabulary, and the way in which it directs our attention, rather than
any manner of deep metaphysical underpinnings for ethics, the task is non-trivial for two familiar
reasons. First, the way in which we direct our attention shapes a good deal of our ethical life. Second,
our traditional ethical theories and concepts have largely been developed with a view toward talking
about humans rather than anything else. They are anthropocentric in ways that can sometimes make
the importance of the non-human difficult to appreciate [33].
The difficulties this gives rise to may be accepted even by those who nonetheless endorse a
broadly anthropocentric standpoint. Given the limitations of our human-focused ethical vocabulary,
we are faced with the temptations of either inventing new ethical concepts (which would initially lack
the authority of our existing concepts) or else of extending the sense of our existing concepts in ways
which are, at the very least, awkward. The former can, at times, be unavoidable if we are to do justice
to a recognised pattern of valuing or to a significant change in the world. However, a concern for the
authority of ethical concepts will favour the latter option and what is known as “moral extensionism”
(or, sometimes, “ethical extensionism”) [34]. Talk about, for example, a “cosmological ethic” will
lack the authority (the normative significance) of talk about “diversity”, “duty”, and “rights” [35].
The default, then, will be to try to get the latter to perform the required work. The former will become
a good candidate for adoption only if this cannot readily be done.
New concepts are, of course, sometimes required in order to fill a gap, in cases where extension
cannot readily be carried out. The concept of “Geoethics” itself is an innovation, with the strong
justification that it marks out a newly emerged discipline bringing together ethics and the geological
sciences [2]. Although we might want to say that it is part innovation and part fusion of two existing
concepts the take-up of the concept can be culturally inflected and variable [36]. Extending the sense
of a concept can sometimes go wrong, or else it can be highly provisional, a placeholder for a more
naturally formulated discourse. Talk about the “rights of places” during early discussions of space
ethics [37], or about “the rights of trees” [38] during the first wave of contemporary environmental
ethics, are obvious examples. Do either of these have rights? The oddness of the question, even when
answered with a “no”, may suggest the strangeness of the disciplines. (Which have now moved on
from such early formulations). Admittedly, there are specialised legal contexts in which the idea of
corporate agency is appealed to in order to make sense of duties and obligations by allowing that
non-individuals actually do have legal rights. (Which is not something that settles questions about
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the possession of moral rights). David Boyd’s legal take on these matters in The Rights of Nature
(2017) presses the point in the spirit of Leopold and Westra. Again, the emphasis is placed upon
living systems, groups of living beings (species), and life-supporting systems. There is a tradition
of argument along these lines, stretching back to Christopher D. Stone’s classic paper “Should Trees
Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects” in the Southern California Law Review back
in 1972, during the early development of contemporary environmentalism [38]. It does frame legal
(and sometimes also moral) standing in terms of the most convenient legal terminology, i.e., rights, the
associations of which with agency and even personhood remain difficult to pare away.
As a more minimal point, it will at least, from time to time, be a useful legal convenience to appeal
not to agency simpliciter, but to corporate agency as a model for talk about our duties in relation to
rivers and places. (These are two of Boyd’s paradigmatic cases). However, carrying over the concept of
rights will be a little more awkward given that what ultimately grounds talk about the rights and duties
of corporate agents is the presence of actual individual agents who help to constitute the “corporate
agents” or legal persons. Places and rivers do not have this decompositional advantage. They are not
made up of agents or persons. Because of this, the legal shorthand of referring to their rights is far
more contrived.
Viewed from the standpoint of animal ethics, and animal rights advocacy in particular, it may
also be unwelcome. The persuasive strategy adopted to extend agency beyond the bounds of sentience
is to do as Boyd does and move sequentially from animals (where rights are, in at least cases such
as primates and cetaceans, difficult to deny), on to species, then to places and rivers, and ultimately
to the Earth as a whole (or even “Mother Earth” as it figures in Boyd’s text). Animals and species
are appealed to, in part, as a softening up argument to shift us away from a more anthropocentric
standpoint in which only humans can be the bearers of rights. If that was all that the appeal did,
then few objections could be raised against it (unless we happened to be committed to sentientism,
which is not the standpoint adopted here).. However, the link between rights attributions in the case of
animals and in the case of rivers and places is taken to be stronger, such that accepting the former puts
us on the path to accepting the latter. With some small cluster of additional assumptions, the rights of
places will be entailed.
What is particularly worrying here is that it makes one of the oldest counter-arguments to animal
rights too easy run, a reductio: given animal rights, absurd consequences would follow and so at least
some of the initial premises of a claim of animal rights must be false. The strategy does no favours
to animal rights advocacy because it ties them to a claim that it likely to be rejected by otherwise
sympathetic commentators. Additionally, this is a very different point from the one brought into play
earlier: over-reliance upon rights talk within animal ethics is unwise. This point is, after all, consistent
with rights attributions.
Yet, if our ethical duties in relation to places cannot easily be understood by appeal to rights,
what then is a more appropriate way to make sense of them? One option, favoured here, is to focus
instead upon appeals to the “integrity” of places. This will allow for a naturalness of formulation,
but will still do so through an extension of our existing moral vocabulary, rather than through the
invention of any new concept that might lack the authority of the latter. On this matter, a point of
good methodology, the move towards rights can still be accepted as the right kind of move. We do not
deprive ourselves of the normative authority of existing ethical concepts unless we absolutely have to.
New terminology is not the default option.
On this approach, what we respect, when we respect places, and what we have a duty to protect,
is not (except occasionally in the contrived legalistic sense) the rights of places, but it may well be their
integrity, and this, conveniently, accommodates the point that most places change and alter in ways
that we would not wish to prevent. Change and even certain kinds of use need not violate integrity
unless we adopt a peculiarly static account of the latter. Indeed, if we are to say some of the more
interesting things about the integrity of a place, such as Mars or the Earth, then we will have to say
why their integrity is preserved in spite of ongoing surface changes.
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Again, as a methodological point, the suggestion here is not that integrity is the only concept
needed by Geoethics. Such a claim would be not only false, but also incoherent: the integrity of
things is a deontological concept. That is to say, it concerns duty (Ancient Greek: deon = what is right
and proper) and, more specifically, it concerns what we have a duty to respect. Already, multiple
established concepts are in play, and not just a single concept. There could not be just one ethical
concept, but (counterfactually) if there was it could not be integrity, because of the way that the concept
of integrity is bound together with other concepts.
However, in established discussions of integrity within general ethical theory (and even in the
Geoethics sources cited at the start of this paper), the concept is ordinarily associated with personal
integrity rather than with the integrity of places. In such uses, it is a concept that is focused upon
human character and virtue. It is about what is a good thing to be rather than what is a good thing
to do. In such uses, it is not a strictly deontological concept. However, it still draws upon familiar
applications of the concept from outside of ethical theory, ordinary uses which apply not only to
persons. Indeed, while Nikitina (2016) generally uses the term to refer to good professional character,
it is occasionally used by her to refer to integrity of other sorts, including the integrity of places [3].
Generally, if we say that “the integrity of x” has been compromised, no-one will be confused about
what is meant, irrespective of whether x is an experiment, a sealed enclosure, a procedure, a data
set, and so on. Accordingly, in relation to places and things, appeal to integrity permits an ease of
expression that talk about the rights of things ordinarily lacks. Additionally, it does so while still
drawing upon the authority of an existing character-focused ethical concept that can be reworked
in a more deontological manner that does not introduce overtones of agency or personhood and is
therefore more suited to Geoethics (which is strongly weighted towards deontology) [39].
Such talk seems also to track something about objects themselves, or in their own right. As a
way of gaining sympathy for the term’s use in relation to abiotic objects (including places), it was
pointed out, in Rolston’s treatment of space ethics, that we number some objects and name others [9].
The practice of naming is, on this account, symptomatic of the presence of integrity or of our inclination
to attribute something like integrity. If the claim is not pressed too far, there may be something to it.
Planets are named but asteroids are (typically) numbered. Although, here, we may point out that they
are often named as well, as a reward for discovery or for some other reason. There are also hybrid
practices, as with the extra-solar planet Kepler 22B.
As a further qualification, we may also reflect upon the practices of naming that involve a mixed
attitude towards moral standing: slaves in the antebellum South were given names that set them
apart from the free white population; pets are often given names that we do not give to other humans,
names that reflect their lesser standing. Even so, the differentiation between routine asteroids and
other solar system bodies is an appealing one. It is in line with an important distinction made in recent
U.S. legislation (the SPACE Act of 2015 [40]) that draws a contrast between “space resources” and the
subclass of “asteroid resources”, with a view towards future mining operations. The shared thought
seems to be that there would be something significantly different about mining asteroids and mining a
planetary surface or a moon. An appeal to integrity can help us to provide various narratives about
this difference, and about something ethically significant that is lacking in the case of most asteroids in
the belt [41].
We can, however, be a little more precise about what the integrity of places involves and how,
in some important respects, it draws upon and connects up with our understanding of personal
integrity. As a provisional formulation, we may define the integrity of places as follows: A place with
integrity will have a distinctive, unique, or near-unique structure or composition. This structure or
composition will be present because of a unique history and will contribute to diversity.
As this is a multi-point definition, we may expect there to be marginal cases where some of the
above considerations apply but others do not. It is also, as indicated, provisional. It is also conveniently
general and will allow for mutually-competing and narrower accounts of the concept to be put in place.
Nonetheless, it is not so general that it performs no work. If we adopt it, or some near reformulation,
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there will be obvious inclusions and obvious exclusions. Objects and places with integrity will include
planets, moons, particular structures on both, and the larger asteroids such as Ceres, Vesta, Hygeia,
and Philae. Among the exclusions, we may number commonplace rocks and the overwhelming
majority of objects in the asteroid belt. Marginal cases will include comets and the interstellar medium.
Perhaps comets (or at least some comets) belong among the former, while the interstellar medium
belongs among the latter, or else it should not be on the list at all. Comets may be compositionally
and structurally quite mundane to all but those researching them and attempting to land on them;
however, they have distinct relational properties (such as special trajectories) that set them apart from
routine bodies in the asteroid belt. A case for integrity might be made. However, reasonable opinions
may differ on such matters. This is part of what makes such cases marginal. The appeal to relational
properties might be disputed, and we would still have (cultural significance) grounds for the protection
where it would obviously be required, e.g., Halley’s Comet, even if the comet in question actually
lacked integrity in the relevant sense. In the case of the interstellar medium, the rationale for appeal to
the concept of integrity as a protection-focused concept falls away. It is too vast for questions about
harm, damage, and protection to have any traction.
While much of this discussion has been shaped by a concern for the ethics of human activity in
space, the proposed definition would also yield intuitively plausible distinctions if it was applied to
Earth systems such as terrestrial woodland and waterways. Old growth forests will have a stronger
claim upon integrity than stretches of uniformly planted commercial pine. The Colorado River will
have a greater claim upon integrity than a water tank, even if the latter stretched for more or less the
same distance. Such terrestrial cases, together with the marginal cases and the multi-point nature of
the definition, can draw our attention to something significant: together, they suggest that judgments
about integrity may often be a matter of degrees, rather than always being binary. We need not simply
say that some object or place has it while another lacks it. Rather, we may allow that a place or object o
has integrity with respect to its properties p1, . . . , pn, to degree d.
This idea, that the integrity of places may often be a matter of degree, marks another point of
continuity with our familiar use of the concept in personal contexts. Compromises with regard to our
preferences are an ongoing necessity. However, they do not always mean that our personal integrity
has itself been compromised. Otherwise, personal integrity is something that none of us would ever
possess because of the continuous element of compromise in our lives. Yet, some compromises are
“compromises too far”. Similarly, respect for the integrity of a place need not require us to adopt a
“hands off” attitude that rejects all forms of use or deliberate change. Lunar impacts still occur and
result in change, but it would be odd to say that the changes they involve pose any sort of threat to
lunar integrity. Comparable deliberate change brought about by humans could hardly be judged to be
a greater threat to such integrity unless we hold that anthropogenic change is automatically change of
a more integrity altering sort. The justification for such a view is unclear.
Matters of judgment about change and integrity become harder in cases that involve more
extensive alterations or structural damage. For example, and for various reasons concerning its
concentration in the upper layers of lunar regolith, dedicated mining operations for a steady supply
of helium-3 (3He) on a scale required to replace nuclear fusion on the Earth would need to involve
something akin to strip mining rather than deep mining. This would require considerable surface
damage [41,42]. Mining on such a scale would almost certainly raise concerns about the integrity of
the lunar surface, concerns that more limited mining operations for more modest amounts of 3He
need not raise. We might, as a result, judge that the greater logistical difficulties of 3He mining from
asteroids are worth accepting in order to protect the lunar surface [41,43].
Integrity, understood in these terms, allows us to make plausible distinctions between reasonable
candidates for protection and less plausible candidates. It does so in ways that will allow for change
and, in the case of planetary bodies and their moons, it need not be seen as an insurmountable
obstacle to economic development or to the establishing of a human presence. Rather, it may shape the
pattern of the latter in various ways, helping to avoid actions that might be a cause for later regret.
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Two key advantages also stand out. First, appeal to the integrity of places may help to address the
widespread concern that the 1967 understanding of planetary protection is simply too narrow to be
indefinitely sustained. However, if we are not only protecting science from the dangers of forward
contamination, but also protecting people from the dangers of back contamination, what exactly
should we be protecting? The integrity of places would seem to be a persuasive answer, or at least a
plausible candidate answer. Understood in the above terms, it helps to pick out exactly the kind of
objects and places about whose protection a culturally-sensitive consensus might eventually be built.
Second, and perhaps just as important for the traction of ethical influence upon matters of policy,
the concept of integrity is metaphysically neutral or at least as neutral as any ethical concept can be
expected to be. That is to say, while integrity talk has in the past been associated strongly with ideas
about inherent value, and with notions of poesis and biogenic nature, particularly by Rolston (1986)
but also by Westra (1994), there are obvious disadvantages to attempts to give the concept too much
metaphysical depth. Such a move may create difficulties for dialogue. It may be best if, when we
appeal to integrity, we do not have to commit one way or another on the idea that places have a
metaphysical, inherent value that can be understood as a special sort of moral property, thought of
as entirely separate from human responsiveness. Here, it might reasonably be objected that the
established normative content of the concept of integrity is being under-estimated. Over the past
four decades a significant number of agreements have begun to employ the concept. Here, we may
think of the Great Lakes Water Quality agreement between the US and Canada (1978), the UN’s Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), and its World Charter for Nature (1982). This is
what we might call normative baggage. However, it is newer baggage than that associated with the
concept of rights (which, in some or other form, dates back for thousands of years, even though the
terminology of recht is somewhat newer). Perhaps more importantly, these uses of the concept of
integrity are embedded within environmental discourses about ecosystems. They concern the integrity
of the latter, and not the integrity of places that may or may not support life. They are descendants
of Leopoldian integrity and, as such, are bound up of limited use with regard to ethical issues in,
for example, space. For the latter, a quite different concept of integrity is required. It need not, however,
be as metaphysically “thick” as Rolston imagined.
Nor need we commit to anything else that might provide some manner of deep philosophical
underpinning for our practices of valuing. These practices will continue, irrespective of the
philosophical stories that we tell about them and irrespective of how illuminating the latter may
sometimes be. This is not, of course, a point against philosophy, it is simply a reaffirmation that
subordinating ethics to metaphysics is not always the only or best option. Accordingly, a concept of
integrity can readily be used, and used in relation to the same features of the same places, by those
who are committed to the idea that places can reasonably be respected and valued without appeal
to some human interest, and by those who remain unconvinced by the arguments presented above
(i.e., those who remain committed to a strictly indirect justification, even at the expense of motivations
and justifications becoming disconnected). Indeed, even among those who defend philosophically
deep notions of “inherent value”, or some equivalent notion, talk about the integrity of places does not
actually entail agreement about which is the best account of such value. (There are several plausible
theories of “metaethics”).
None of what has been presented above is, of course, conclusive. While there is local
argumentation, it is not proof-like. It merely draws out various advantages that geoethical use
of integrity (in a broadened sense) may have. Talk about integrity dovetails well with a commitment
to inherent value, and with the idea that we do have reasons to value non-instrumentally, but it
does not presuppose either. This level of metaphysical neutrality is convenient and need not lead to
confusion. After all, many of our most important ethical concepts are like this. They are open-textured.
Detailed metaphysical commitments cannot readily be read off of them. We can, for example, agree
that individual humans have rights, and even agree about the kind of rights that they should have in a
liberal society, without necessarily agreeing about the philosophical or metaphysical underpinnings of
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such rights beyond their connection to some types of entities rather than others. We need not agree
on our stories about metaethics and metaphysics, stories about why the individuals (or groups of
individuals) in question might happen to have them. However, if we do not agree about the deep
metaphysical underpinnings of ethics in the human case (where the level of disagreement among
philosophical ethicists is high), we are unlikely to agree in non-human cases, and in particular in the
kinds of cases that are furthest removed from our own lives as sentient beings. One of the desirable
features of any ethical concept is that it will help to bridge intractable philosophical disagreements
of this sort or provide ways of bracketing them out; another is that it allows for a naturalness of
formulation. (Legal contrivances are less permissible in ethical discourse).
The concept of integrity meets both of these requirements. While the meeting of such minimal
requirements, or adequacy conditions, is not a conclusive reason for accepting the treating any concept
as central, it does at least make integrity a good candidate for such a role.
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